This is not a sovereign citizen case but a case in which the belief in conspiracy theories led to real world violence.
In a high-profile appeal before the Ninth Circuit, federal public defenders representing David Wayne DePape argue that his conviction for attempting to kidnap former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and assaulting her husband, Paul Pelosi, should be vacated due to fundamental errors at trial. DePape, who was convicted in federal court following an October 2022 break-in at the Pelosis’ San Francisco home, is currently serving a life sentence in California state custody for the same conduct.
DePape’s appellate attorneys argue that his convictions federal statutes that criminalize violence or kidnapping attempts against public officials “on account of the performance of official duties”—are legally unsupported. They contend the government failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that DePape’s actions were motivated by Nancy Pelosi’s actual work as a member of Congress, a key element required to sustain a conviction under both statutes.
The facts of the break-in itself are largely uncontested. DePape, carrying a hammer, zip ties, duct tape, and other items, entered the Pelosi residence in the early morning hours of October 28, 2022. After confronting Paul Pelosi and asking about Nancy Pelosi’s whereabouts, the two spoke for nearly 20 minutes before Pelosi managed to call 911. When police arrived, DePape struck Paul Pelosi in the head with the hammer in front of the officers.
The defense does not dispute that the assault occurred, but they maintain that DePape’s motivation was misunderstood. They assert that DePape was not targeting Nancy Pelosi because of her official role in Congress, but because he viewed her as part of a broader, conspiratorial cabal of elites involved in child abuse and societal corruption. The appellate brief highlights that DePape’s digital records and post-arrest statements repeatedly mentioned figures like Tom Hanks, George Soros, and an academic gender theorist referred to as “Target 1”—none of whom hold public office. According to DePape’s testimony, he only targeted Pelosi first because her home was easier to access than that of “Target 1,” who lived elsewhere in San Francisco. DePape had allegedly intended to use Pelosi to lure “Target 1” to him.
Because the statutes under which DePape was convicted require specific proof that the crime was committed “on account of” the victim’s official duties, the defense argues that DePape’s broader anti-elite motivations fell outside the scope of the law. They claim there was simply no evidence that he acted due to Pelosi’s legislative activities or other official conduct.
The brief also challenges the district court’s refusal to give a jury instruction defining what it means to act “on account of the performance of official duties.” DePape’s attorneys had proposed an instruction stating that Congress members’ official duties include legislation, constituent services, and committee work—but not campaign fundraising or media appearances. Although the judge initially expressed interest in giving a version of this instruction, she ultimately declined. This left the jury with no guidance on interpreting a phrase central to the case, which the prosecution highlighted in rebuttal to discredit the defense’s theory.
Another basis for appeal is the admission of graphic images and videos showing the aftermath of the hammer assault. The defense had offered to stipulate that a dangerous weapon was used, arguing that the bloody footage had minimal relevance and was unfairly prejudicial. Despite this, the court allowed the jury to view the videos, including footage of Paul Pelosi unconscious and struggling to breathe. The government used these visuals in its opening and closing arguments, reinforcing the emotional impact of the evidence. The defense argues this violated Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which bars evidence where unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value.
Finally, DePape’s legal team argues that the district court denied him the right to speak before sentencing, as required under Federal Rules. The court sentenced him to 30 years in prison—the statutory maximum—without giving him an opportunity to allocute. The government subsequently asked the court to “reopen” sentencing under Rule 35(a), which allows courts to correct certain technical or clerical errors within 14 days. The court agreed and held a second sentencing hearing, at which DePape was allowed to speak. However, the defense argues that this “reopening” exceeded the scope of Rule 35(a), which does not permit full resentencing or correction of non-technical errors like failure to allow allocution. They contend that DePape should be resentenced by a different judge, given the trial judge’s previously stated views likening DePape to the assassins of Presidents Lincoln and Kennedy and accusing him of “taunting America.”
The Ninth Circuit has consolidated DePape’s two appeals—one from the original conviction and one from the resentencing—and will determine whether the trial court’s errors warrant a new trial or resentencing. At the heart of the case is a key legal question: does targeting a public official based on conspiracy theories and personal grievances, unrelated to legislative duties, fall within the scope of statutes designed to protect government functions? The resolution could set a significant precedent for how political violence is prosecuted in federal court.
Source: David Wayne DePape was convicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California under case number 3:22-cr-00426. He has appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where the case is docketed under case numbers 24-3191 and 24-3458.