In Nicholas Domnic Bollin v. State, Bollin was convicted on four counts of Credit or Debit Card Abuse and sentenced to 24 months in a state jail for each count. He appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in allowing him to waive his right to counsel and represent himself.
The trial court ordered a psychiatric evaluation of Bollin eight months prior to the trial to assess his competency. Bollin refused to attend, but the psychologist reviewed his records and concluded that he was competent to stand trial. Bollin identified as an “American State National,” a self-identification associated with Sovereign Citizen ideology. Despite this, the psychologist did not find evidence of severe mental illness, and the trial court accepted the competency finding.
During pre-trial hearings, Bollin refused appointed counsel and insisted on representing himself. The court warned him about the risks of self-representation, but Bollin repeatedly affirmed his decision, declaring that he was representing himself “sui juris.” The court ultimately accepted his waiver of counsel, reading the waiver form to him when he refused to sign it. Bollin remained silent throughout the trial, refusing to participate in any aspect of the proceedings, including jury selection, cross-examinations, and closing arguments.
Here is how he behaved in court:
During the status hearing, Bollin refused to “accept” previously appointed counsel and asserted he was representing himself. The trial court proceeded to warn Bollin of the dangers and disadvantages in representing himself, and Bollin answered these warnings with, “I’m good,” “I know this,” and “I do [understand this].” When asked if he would sign a form with the warnings on it, Bollin responded, “I can represent myself without signing anything,” and “I’m not going to sign anything.”
The trial court then read the warning form to Bollin. When the court inquired as to his background information, Bollin responded, “Doesn’t matter.” When asked if he did not want to answer the question, Bollin responded, “I don’t have to.” The trial court then stated, “you’re not giving me much information on your background or your experience related to any legal experience that you have –.” Bollin interrupted and again stated, “I don’t have to.”
Bollin then stated, “I have my own lawful counsel.” The trial court clarified, “When you say you have your own lawful counsel, you understand that’s you?” Bollin replied, “Yes.” When the court read from the form that Bollin had appointed counsel, Bollin again rejected appointed counsel, saying, “I do not accept her.” The trial court finished reading the form and asked again if Bollin wanted to represent himself. Bollin replied that he was representing himself as “sui juris.” The trial court ultimately signed the waiver form and released the court-appointed attorney.
Six months later and just prior to jury selection, the trial court sought to confirm that Bollin still wanted to represent himself. After giving Bollin a chance to speak his mind, which he did, Bollin, thereafter, refused to speak. Thus, the trial court presumed that, by his failure to respond, Bollin had not changed his mind regarding self-representation. The trial court read a new warning form to Bollin and signed it. Bollin did not respond to any questions asked of him during and after the reading and would not sign the form. As a precaution, however, the trial court appointed stand-by counsel for Bollin if needed.
Throughout the trial, Bollin remained silent. He did not conduct voir dire or make any peremptory strikes or challenges for cause. He did not make an opening statement. He neither cross-examined the State’s witnesses, nor called any of his own witnesses. He did not participate in the charge conference and did not make any closing remarks. Although present, he also did not participate in the punishment phase of the trial. Further, he did not request the assistance of his standby counsel.
On appeal, Bollin argued that he was not competent to waive his right to counsel and that his waiver was neither knowing nor intentional. The appellate court, applying the standard set forth in Faretta v. California, found that the decision to waive counsel must be competent, knowing, and voluntary. It also noted that while a heightened standard exists for a waiver of counsel, the competency standard is the same as for standing trial. The court rejected Bollin’s claim of incompetency, stating that there was no evidence of severe mental illness, and that his behavior was consistent with his identification as an American State National, not mental incapacity.
The court further ruled that Bollin’s waiver was made knowingly and intelligently, as the trial court had twice warned him about the risks of self-representation, and the waiver form had been read to him twice. Bollin’s consistent refusals to engage with counsel and his understanding of the trial process indicated that he was aware of the consequences of his decision.
The appellate court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Bollin to represent himself, and it affirmed the judgment.