I was watching a 1993 documentary about Gordon Kahl and was reminded of a court filing from a few months back. Scott William Faul, currently serving a life sentence for his involvement in a deadly 1983 shootout with U.S. Marshals recently filed two habeas corpus petitions challenging the terms of his incarceration and the denial of his parole. Faul, who was convicted of second-degree murder and other crimes, argued that his continued imprisonment violates federal law and his constitutional rights. The court issued an Order and Report and Recommendation recommending the denial of both petitions, along with related motions.
The incident that led to Faul’s incarceration occurred on February 13, 1983, in Medina, North Dakota. Faul was traveling with Gordon Kahl, a tax protester and prominent member of the anti-government Posse Comitatus group, along with Kahl’s son Yorie and others. The U.S. Marshals had set up a roadblock to arrest Gordon Kahl for probation violations stemming from his refusal to file income taxes. What began as a tense standoff escalated into a violent exchange of gunfire. Deputy U.S. Marshals Kenneth Muir and Robert Cheshire were killed, and three other law enforcement officers were wounded. Faul and Yorie Kahl fired on officers during the shootout, and Faul was later accused of helping the injured Yorie Kahl escape.
Faul maintains that he was an innocent bystander in what he describes as the “deep tragedy of the Medina killings,” claiming the Marshals ambushed him and his companions. However, the evidence presented at trial painted a different picture. Faul was convicted on multiple counts, including two for second-degree murder, four for assaulting law enforcement officers, one for conspiracy, and one for harboring a fugitive. He received a life sentence plus 15 years.
Gordon Kahl’s actions and the ideology of Posse Comitatus offer insight into the broader context of the Medina incident. Posse Comitatus adherents reject the legitimacy of the federal government, particularly its authority over taxation and law enforcement. The group’s anti-government stance and reliance on violent resistance echo modern sovereign citizen beliefs, which challenge the jurisdiction of courts, law enforcement, and other government entities. These movements often engage in disruptive legal tactics and have been linked to confrontations with authorities. The Medina shootout is one of the most infamous examples of such ideology escalating into violence.
In his recent legal challenges, Faul filed two habeas petitions. The first (referred to as Faul VII) argued that his parole eligibility date was miscalculated under 18 U.S.C. § 4206(d), asserting that he should have been released after serving 30 years. The second (Faul VIII) contested the U.S. Parole Commission’s decision to deny him parole, claiming that the decision violated his due process rights, punished him for exercising his First Amendment rights, and relied on an unconstitutionally vague statute.
The court found that Faul’s arguments lacked merit. It concluded that while Faul is eligible for parole consideration, he is not automatically entitled to release. The court highlighted the Parole Commission’s rationale for denying parole, including the severity of Faul’s crimes, his failure to accept responsibility, his lack of participation in rehabilitative programs, and his anti-government rhetoric, which suggested he might not comply with parole conditions. The Commission was particularly concerned about statements Faul made referring to law enforcement officers as “murderous thugs” and accusing the judiciary of being controlled by “Lucifer-worshiping” officials. They noted that his offense was “highly aggravate[d],” he did not accept responsibility for his participation, he continued to challenge his convictions, and he had not participated in “any meaningful programming” to reduce his likelihood of recidivism or to change the behavior that led to his conviction. Such rhetoric, combined with Faul’s continued insistence on his innocence, led the Commission to determine there was a reasonable probability that he might reoffend.
Faul’s constitutional claims were also rejected. The court ruled that the Parole Commission’s decision was supported by a rational basis and did not violate his Fifth Amendment right to due process. The court further found that Faul’s First Amendment rights had not been infringed, as the Commission’s consideration of his statements was relevant to assessing his readiness for release. Finally, the court upheld the constitutionality of the statute guiding parole decisions, rejecting Faul’s argument that it was unconstitutionally vague.
In addition to denying the habeas petitions, the court rejected Faul’s motion to prevent his transfer from a prison in Minnesota to another facility in Michigan, noting that the transfer had already occurred and that placement decisions by the Bureau of Prisons are not subject to judicial review. The court also denied Faul’s motion to appoint counsel, concluding that he had effectively represented himself and that the case did not warrant additional legal representation.
Faul’s case serves as a stark reminder of the intersections between extremist ideologies, violent anti-government actions, and the challenges of managing individuals who continue to adhere to such beliefs while incarcerated. The court’s decision reinforces the discretionary nature of parole and the importance of rehabilitation and accountability in determining an inmate’s readiness for release. Faul’s petitions ultimately failed to demonstrate any violations of law or constitutional rights, leaving him to serve the remainder of his sentence.